In this paper, I consider a problem of multi-dimensional screening in the case when the number of consumer's characteristics, m, differs from n, the number of goods produced by a monopolist. I show that, in the case when n > m, the qualitative features of solution are similar to those obtained by Rochet and Chone (1998) for the case n = m. When the monopolist has too few instruments (n < m), new qualitative features arise. In particular, there are distortions in the outward direction at the top, discontinuity in the bundle of goods consumed on the lower boundary of participation region, and full separation of types is impossible over any open subset of type space.
Introduction
In this paper, I consider a problem of multi-dimensional screening. The general formulation of the problem is due to Armstron (1996) and Wilson (1993) , and goes as follows. Consider a multi-product monopoly producing n goods with a convex cost function. The preferences of a consumer over these goods can be parameterized by an m-dimensional type vector. Types of the consumers are distributed according to a density function f (·) defined over a convex open bounded set Ω ⊂ R m . Assume that f (·) is continuously differentiable on Ω and can be extended by continuity on its closure. The monopolist is interested in maximizing profits by choosing a tariff which is a function from the set of bundles of goods * Tel.: +61-38844-9733.
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to the real line. The tariff determines how much a consumer will pay for a particular bundle of goods. Armstron (1996) formulated the problem for arbitrary m and n and derived a solution in some special cases. Under rather strong assumptions both on the utility function and the distribution over types, he showed that the optimal tariff is cost-based. Armstron (1999) gave an approximate solution when the number of goods is large. He showed that in this case the optimal tariff can be approximated by a two-part tariff when taste parameters are distributed independently across products, and a menu of two-part tariffs when there is a correlation in the distribution of types. Rochet and Chone (1998) developed a general technique for dealing with the problem of multi-dimensional screening when n = m and utilities are linear in types. Their formulation differs from that of Armstron (1996) and Wilson (1993) in that they allow the monopolist to choose the product line. This distinction is not very important, however, and their results can be compared with those of Armstrong and Wilson. They did not make any particular assumptions about the type distribution apart from that the density function f (·) is bounded away from zero on Ω.
In this paper, I will follow the linearity assumption of Rochet and Chone, but relax the assumption m = n. One can think of a lot of situations where this assumption is not satisfied. Consider, for example, the case when a monopolist is a long distance company which allows its customers to make calls to two locations A and B. Assume that customers who have relatives at location A usually also have relatives at location B. If τ i is time spend by a customer on talks with location i and t is the amount paid by the customer to the company then her utility is αu(τ A , τ B ) − t, where function u is the same among the customers, and α is a privately observed type. In this case, n = 2, while m = 1; hence n > m. For an example where n < m, consider a situation when a monopolist is a computer company. Suppose it designs a computer and a piece of software. Consumers may differ in their preferences over a computer, a piece of software, and a bundle consisting of a computer and a piece of software. (For instance, their utility functions may be of the form u(x 1 , x 2 ) = α 1 x 1 + α 2 x 2 + α 3 v(x 1 , x 2 ), where x 1 , x 2 are qualities of a computer and software respectively). In this case, n = 2, while m = 3; hence n < m. I will argue that the former case can be easily reduced to the case n = m studied by Rochet and Chone (1998) . The latter case is more complicated. I will derive a system of partial differential equations characterizing the optimal solution and use it to solve some particular examples.
The model
Consider a multi-product monopoly producing n goods. Consumers have preferences over the bundles of these goods that are parameterized by an m-dimensional column vectors. The types of consumers are distributed according to a density f (·) function, on the set Ω ⊂R m . The set Ω is assumed to be open, bounded, and convex. The utility of a consumer of type α ∈ Ω, when she consumes a bundle x ∈ X ⊂ R n + and makes a payment of t, is given by
where each of the functions v i (·) is increasing and continuously differentiable, and satisfies a Lipschitz condition in x on X. For a given tariff t :X → R, the firm's profits are given by
where c(·) is the cost of production and x(α) is the bundle purchased by all type-α consumers. The firm is interested in choosing a tariff t (·) to maximize its profits. Given such a tariff, let
Thus, s(α) is the surplus of a consumer of type α who chooses a bundle x ∈ X that maximizes her utility. One can solve (1), (3) to get:
It is important to note that the function t (·), defined by (4), depends on α only through x. More precisely, assume there exist two types α 1 and α 2 such that x(α 1 ) = x(α 2 ), but t 1 = t 2 , where t i ≡ t (α i ). Without loss of generality assume that t 1 > t 2 . But then type α 1 would be better-off choosing x(α 2 ) and paying t 2 , which contradicts the utility maximization by type α 1 . This means that the function t (·) defined in (4) is a tariff, since it maps bundles of goods into the real line. The argument stated in the last paragraph is known as the taxation principle. For a discussion see Rochet (1985) . It is possible to show that s(·) is continuous, convex (and, hence, almost everywhere differentiable), and satisfies the envelope conditions:
For a proof see Armstron (1996) . Conditions (4) and (5) show that the monopolist can be assumed to choose the consumer surplus s(α). If s(α) is implementable by some tariff function t (x) and the utility function is convex in type then s(α) must be convex. It turns out that in the linear case (i.e. when (1) holds) the convexity of s(α) is also sufficient for its implementability. More precisely, we have: Theorem 1. (Rochet, 1987) Let s(·) and x(·) be defined on Ω, with values, respectively, in R and R n . There exists a product line X ⊂ R n and a price schedule t : X → R such that s(α) satisfies (3) for almost all α if and only if:
Taking into account (1)-(4) and Theorem 1, the monopolist's problem can be rewritten in the form:
In (7), s 0 (α) is the value of the best outside option for type α. Rochet and Chone (1998) proved existence, uniqueness, and provided a full characterization of the solution to problem (6), (7) in the case m = n. In this case, there is no loss of generality assuming v i (x) = x i since it can always be satisfied after an appropriate change of the variables. In the next two sections, I will consider the cases with m < n and m > n, respectively.
The monopolist's problem for the case m < n
In this section, I will consider the case when the number of the goods is larger than the number of the consumer characteristics. In this case, the monopolist has more instruments than needed for perfect screening. It will be useful to interpret the consumer's utility function (1) in the following way. There are m different types of artificial goods, call them "utils". The ith util is produced from a vector of market goods x, using a production function v i (x) . Since the dimensionality of x is greater than the dimensionality of utils space, every possible combination of utils can be produced. Generically, there is a continuum of ways to produce the same combination of utils. Since, given the payment, both the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints depend only on the amount of utils obtained, and not on the vector x that implements them, the monopolist's problem can be divided into two parts. First, choose a vector of goods x such that it minimizes the cost given the levels of util production. Second, solve for the optimal tariff as a function of utils. The second problem is identical to the one solved by Rochet and Chone (1998) ; the first is a simple constrained optimization problem.
To formalize the above intuition, assume that the utility of consumers has the form (1), the functions v i are twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasiconcave, the Jacoby matrix Dv(x) has a full rank for all x ∈ R n + , v i (0) = 0, and lim x k →∞ v i (x) = ∞. The cost function is increasing, convex, twice continuously differentiable, and the eigenvalues of the matrix of its second derivatives are uniformly bounded from above and are uniformly bounded away from zero from below.
First, consider the problem
Given the assumptions, the solution to the problem (8), (9) exists and is unique. Denote this solution by x * (v) and define θ(v) = c(x * (v)). Then θ(v) will be convex, twice continuously differentiable, and the eigenvalues of the matrix of its second derivatives will be uniformly bounded from above and uniformly bounded away from zero from below. Now, the monopolist's problem (6), (7) can be rewritten in the form:
But this is exactly the problem considered by Rochet and Chone (1998) . Using this result the solution to problem (6), (7) in the case m < n is described by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let v * i (α) be the allocation that solves (10) and (11), and t * (α) be the correspondent tariff. Then x(α) = x * (v(α)), and t * (α) solve the monopolist's problem. (10), (11). In particular, this implies that this mechanism is incentive compatible and satisfies the participation constraints. Since both the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints depend on x only through v and t, the mechanism given by (x(α) = x(v(α)), t (α)) is also incentive compatible and satisfies the participation constraints. Let y(α), τ (α) be an arbitrary incentive compatible mechanism, satisfying the participation constraints.
Proof. Suppose the mechanism given by (v(α), t (α)) solves problem
be the corresponding surplus of consumer of type α. Since the mechanism y(α), τ (α) is incentive compatible and satisfies the participation constraints, this surplus function is admissible, i.e. it is convex, satisfies the constraints s(α) ≥ s 0 (α), and the envelope conditions ∇s(α) = v(y(α)). Then, using the definitions of θ(v) and s(α), one can estimate the profits of the monopolist from this mechanism by
and, using the fact that the surplus function is admissible one can write
where the maximum is taken over all convex surplus functions s(·) such that s(α) ≥ s 0 (α) and ∇s(α) = v(y(α)). Finally, using the definitions of x(α) and t (α), one can write
Hence, any incentive compatible mechanism (y(α), τ (α)) satisfying the participation constraints earns profits which do not exceed the profits earned by the mechanism (x(α), t (α)). This completes the proof of the theorem.
In the case n = 1 the approach suggested here is dual to the one suggested by Armstron (1996) for obtaining a cost-based tariffs. Armstron (1996) suggested to maximize the consumer's utility U (α, x, 0) subject to keeping the cost weakly below a fixed level y.
, the problem is reduced to the one-dimensional one and the optimal tariff depends only on y, i.e. it is cost-based. This approach is not limited to the case m < n but it imposes strong joint restrictions on the consumer's utility and the type distribution. Approach suggested here does not impose any restrictions on the type distribution beyond f (α) be bounded away from zero and allows the utility to be any linear function of the type vector α.
Theorem 2 reduces the case m < n to the case m = n, studied by Rochet and Chone (1998) . First, form bundles which minimize the cost subject to the constraint that they provide certain levels of utils of each type, then solve the screening problem using these bundles as instruments. Example 1. Let us illustrate Theorem 1 by an example. Let m = 1, n = 2. Assume that consumers' utilities are given by
while the cost of the monopolist is given by
Assume that Ω = [0, 1]. Theorem 2 suggests that the monopolist should first solve the problem:
s.t.
to get x 1 = x 2 = x/2, θ(x) = x 2 /4. Then she has to solve a one-dimensional screening problem a la Mussa and Rosen (1978) .
It is straightforward to see that there are no distortions at the top, i.e. the bundle consumed by type α = 1 is efficient. Indeed, since for the one-dimensional problem the choice of x is efficient for α = 1 (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) , one can obtain
Hence x 1 (1) = x 2 (1) = 1, which is the efficient level. I will elaborate more on this point in Section 6.
The monopolist's problem for the case m > n
In the previous section, we saw that the case m < n can be reduced to the case m = n. The case when the number of goods is less than the number of the consumer's characteristics is much more complicated. Nevertheless, thinking in terms of utils, as in the previous section, will still be helpful for developing an intuition. For simplicity, in this section I will normalize the value of the outside option to be zero for all types. The monopolist's problem then has the form
Assume that the utility and the cost satisfy the same regularity conditions as in previous section and that v i (0) = 0. Introduce new variables, utils, by
Since m > n, not all points in the utils space will be feasible. The set of feasible points forms an n-dimensional manifold in R m . Generally, such a manifold can be described as a set
Without loss of generality, one can assume
In terms of the utils, the monopolist's problem can be rewritten as
The above formulation suggests that it can be useful to think about the problem with m > n as a problem with m = n, but with some constraints on the production technology, so that only certain combinations amongst m goods can be produced. For example, think about sheep that are grown for meet and wool. Though meat and wool are separate goods, one cannot produce them independently since both of them are determined by the size of the cattle.
It is also important to note, that while the production of the first n utils is costly, the monopolist does not incur any additional cost producing utils n + 1, . . . , m. As we will see below, this has important qualitative implications. For example, it results in a discontinuity in the consumption bundle on the boundary of the participation region.
Let a, b denote the inner product of vectors a and b, and ||a|| denote the Euclidean norm of a vector a. The following theorem holds. 
Then the problem (23)-(24) has a unique solution.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proof of this theorem can be divided into two parts. First, prove existence for the problem where envelope conditions are replaced by weak inequalities. Second, prove that the inequality constraints bind on the optimal solution and, hence, the solution for the problem with the inequality constraints is in fact the solution of the original problem. The first part is purely technical, while the second is intuitive. Indeed, one can think about the problem in a following way. There are n goods that can be produced at a cost. Production of them automatically creates capacity for production of other goods which now can be produced at no cost but are still valuable to consumer. Thus, monopolist would prefer to fully utilize her capacities. Coming back to the example about sheep cattle that precedes the theorem, assume that cutting the wool from the sheep is costless. Evidently, in this case the monopolist would always cut all the wool from the sheep prior to slaughtering.
It is interesting to note that the full separation of types cannot occur over any open subset of Ω. In other words, for any open Ω 1 ⊂ Ω there will be α 1 , α 2 ∈ Ω 1 such that α 1 = α 2 but x(α 1 ) = x(α 2 ). Indeed, assume that full separation over Ω 1 is possible, then the optimal allocation x : Ω → R n defines a one-to-one correspondence from Ω 1 into R n . But then the image of Ω 1 under x, being a subset of R n , has dimension m, which is impossible, since n < m. Hence, for m > n the participation region will be sliced into bunching regions. I will illustrate this slicing by an example below.
Now, let us turn to the characterization of solution. First, consider a relaxed problem when the convexity constraint is dropped. One can get the solution of (23)- (24) from the solution of the relaxed problem using the sweeping operator technique, developed by Rochet and Chone (1998) . This technique does not depend on the assumption m = n and, hence, is applicable to this case. Therefore, here I will be concerned only with the relaxed problem.
To characterize the solution of the relaxed problem, form a Hamiltonian:
The costate vector λ takes into account the constraints ∇s = z, while µ j is a Lagrange multiplier on the constraint g j (z) = 0. Let Γ ⊂ Ω be the closure of the set of types served at equilibrium, ∂Γ be the boundary of Γ , and ν be the unit vector, normal to the boundary, and pointing in the outward direction. The following theorem summarizes the main result of this section.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the surplus function s(a) solves the relaxed problem (23)-(24).
Then the solution is characterized by the following conditions: there exists a continuously differentiable vector function λ : R m → R m , and m − n continuously differentiable functions µ j : R m → R, such that:
Inequalities (26) and (27) become equalities at points α ∈ Γ such that s(α) > 0.
For a given vector λ, z is determined by z ∈ arg max H (·). (28)

Proof. First, note that if s(α) solves the relaxed problem (23)-(24) then there exist functions
For a discussion of the method of Lagrange multiplies in this context see Eberhard (1984) or Funk (1962) . Define
for any h such that the function s + εh is admissible. Following steps similar to those in Rochet and Chone (1998) 
, one can show that this condition is equivalent to (26)-(28).
It is useful to note that in the case m = n system (26)- (28) is reduced to the corresponding system in Rochet and Chone (1998) .
Note that if one writes the envelope conditions in a symbolic form As = z, where A = ∇, then Eq. (26) for the costate vector λ can be rewritten in a form
where A * denotes the operator adjoint to A. This agrees with the results obtained in Lions (1971) . In the case m = n, vector λ equals to the gradient of joint surplus and, hence, condition (27) can be interpreted as generalization of the "no distortion at the top" property. Due to the last term in (25), no such interpretation is possible here. I will returns to this point in Section 6.
Observe, that the one-dimensional analog of system (26)- (28) is familiar to the economists from the theory of optimal growth. Inequality (25) governs the evolution of the costate vector λ, inequality (27) is the transversality condition, and condition (28) is the Pontryagin maximum principle.
Application of Theorem 4 for determining optimal tariff
In this section, I am going to use Theorem 4 to solve some particular examples. First, I apply Theorem 4 to a case that can be solved directly to verify that the use of Theorem 4 results into the same answer. Then I use it to solve an example that cannot be solved using any known technique. The main feature of this example is that for each type the consumer's preferences are quasilinear in the second good, but strictly concave in the first good. This makes the amount of the first good consumed in the equilibrium fixed and the price discrimination occurs only with respect to the second good. In both of these examples, the value of the outside option is assumed to be independent of the type and is normalized to be zero. The last example applies technique developed in this paper to the problem first considered by Laffont et al. (1987) and shows that one can arrive at the solution much quicker.
Example 2. Let a type of a consumer be parametrized by a vector α ∈ [0, 1] 2 . Consider a monopolist who produces one good x at a cost
Suppose the types are distributed uniformly on [0, 1] 2 . Let the utility of a consumer be
Note that the change of variables
reduces this problem to a one-dimensional one. Type β is distributed on [0, 2] according to the distribution
Using the standard technique (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) one can obtain
x(β) = 3 2 β − 1. The Hamiltonian for this problem is
Applying Theorem 4
From the last condition one can find
Define the set
Then the following conditions must hold:
Indices near s and µ denote derivatives with respect to the appropriate arguments. For example, s 11 = ∂ 2 s/∂α 2 1 , etc. As it can be verified by a direct substitution, the functions
satisfy the above conditions. These formulae describe the solution in some neighborhood of the point (1,1). Hence, in this neighborhood the optimal allocation is given by
But this is exactly the allocation that was obtained above, using the well-known technique. One can show that in other regions solutions obtained by both techniques also coincide.
Example 3. Let a type of consumer be parametrized by a vector α ∈ [0, 1] 3 . Consider a monopolist who produces two different goods x 1 and x 2 at a cost
Suppose the types are distributed uniformly on [0, 1] 3 . Let the utility of a consumer be
where
Note that this example cannot be solved using any known technique. Indeed, there is no change of variables that will reduce the dimensionality of types as in the previous example, and the optimal tariff is not cost-based, since the indirect utility, defined as the maximum of a consumer's utility for a given level of cost, is not factorized. Under the assumptions I made about functional forms, Theorem 3 guarantees that the optimal tariff exists. The Hamiltonian for this problem is
Applying Theorem 4:
λ, ν ≥ 0, a.e. on ∂Γ (33)
From the last condition
Then the following equations hold:
Let us look for a solution in a form
with b = q(a). Eq. (35) and boundary condition (36) become
Since the problem is now reduced to a one-dimensional screening problem in α 2 , constraint (40) must be satisfied with equality. The general solution to Eq. (38) is given by
where g(·, ·) is an arbitrary continuously differentiable function. One can verify that (42) satisfies (38) by a direct substitution. Boundary conditions (39)- (41) imply
The conditions (43)- (44) should hold as equalities at the point (1,1,1), since there are no upward incentive constraints in either direction for this type and, hence, the equilibrium bundle consumed by this type must be efficient.
Hence,
Under the conditions imposed on q(·), there exists a unique a satisfying (45), call it a * . For example, if q(x) = ln(1 + x) then a * = 2 1/2 . The solution to (46) is given by
Since this function is convex, so is the consumer surplus. Hence, it can be implemented by an appropriate tariff, i.e. the solutions of relaxed and the actual problems coincide. The envelope conditions imply that x 1 = a * , x 2 = 4α 2 −3. This choice of goods is implemented by a tariff:
The value of C does not affect incentive compatibility constraint but affects the participation region. For a given C, the participation region is given by
Hence, an increase of C increases the profits of monopolist from consumers who participate, but decreases the measure of participating consumers. The constant is chosen to equate marginal benefit from the participating consumers and marginal cost from the reduced participation. This can be done numerically.
As one can observe from the solution, all consumers with the same value of α 2 get the same bundle, conditional on the participation. It means that the participation region is sliced on bunching planes α 2 = constant. Consumers who do not participate get zero bundle and pay zero. This means that the quality changes by a jump on the lower boundary of participation region.
The fact that the optimal control does not, in general, satisfy regularity conditions if the constraints beyond smoothness are imposed on the set of admissible controls is well known (Lions, 1971) . I will provide an economic intuition for this effect in the next section.
Example 4. In this example, I apply the method developed in this paper to solve for the optimal tariff in the case when the slope and the intercept of the inverse demand curve are distributed uniformly on the square [0, 1] × [1, 2]. This problem was first considered by Laffont et al. (1987) , so they arrived at an explicit solution. I shall show how the method developed here will quickly lead to the same result.
Let the utility of a consumer be given by
where α 1 and α 2 are distributed independently and uniformly on unit square. The cost of production is zero. Applying Theorem 4 one gets
Consider point (1, 0). Then the boundary conditions and the envelope condition x = s 1 imply x ≥ 1. But since for x > 1 the marginal utility is negative, this implies x(1, 0) = 1. Hence, there is no distortion at the bottom right point.
The boundary conditions should be satisfied as equalities almost everywhere on the intersection of the exterior boundary with the participation region. First, note that a continuous µ could not satisfy these conditions. Indeed, if µ is continuous then x(1, 1) = 1/µ = 1/2, which is the efficient level. But the incentive compatibility constraint between types (1, 0) and (1, 1) implies that it should but biased downwards. Hence, the equations should be considered separately in the neighborhood of point (1, 0) and on the rest of the square.
First, consider the system in the neighborhood of point (1, 0). Let us look for a solution in a form
where w is some constant. Plugging it into the system and going through a straightforward algebra implies
Consider point (1, 1). Observe that µ(1, 1) = 5/2 > 2, hence this solution could not be continued to the region containing the boundary α 2 = 1. Two regions will be separated by isoquant x = x(1, 1) = 2/5.
To find a solution in the second region, consider a system
It can be shown that the solution is given by
Condition x ≥ 0 suggests that the participation region is contained in a set α 1 ≥ 1/2. The exterior normal to the region α 1 ≥ 1/2 at α 1 = 1/2 is ν = (−1, 0) . Hence, λ, ν = α 1 − µx = 1/2 > 0. This implies that the participation region coincides with the set α 1 ≥ 1/2. Taking into account that regions with different solutions for µ are separated by isoquant x = 2/5 we arrive to the following solution:
This is the solution obtained by Laffont et al. (1987) .
Results and discussion
Two qualitative insights obtained in the previous literature on screening are the "no distortion at the top" property and the continuous dependence of the bundle provided in the equilibrium on the type. It is interesting to discuss these properties in the present context.
Let us begin our discussion with the property of the bundle continuity. First, note that in the case m < n this property is preserved. Indeed, as we have seen in Section 3, in this case the monopolist's problem can be separated into two: finding the cost minimizing bundle for a given level of utils production,
and solving the optimal screening problem in the utils space using the technique developed by Rochet and Chone (1998) . The util levels v i implemented in the equilibrium will depend continuously on the type due to a result of Rochet and Chone (1998) . Since the solution of the constrained minimization problem under assumptions of Section 3 will give x(·) as a continuous function of v, the composite function x(v(α)) will depend continuously on α.
In the case m > n, however, x(α) may have a discontinuity on the lower boundary of the participation region. In Example 3, all consumers in the participation region consumed the same amount of the first good, namely a * > 1. Hence, it is impossible to join their consumption bundles with the zero bundle in a continuous way. The reason for the occurrence of these jumps is that utils of the types n + 1, . . . , m are produced for free and, hence, the cost function is not strictly convex in utils.
To get some intuition, consider the case m = n = 1. Let the monopolist has a constant marginal cost of production c, and X = [0, 1]. Then the consumers with virtual types below c are not served (get x(α) = 0), while those with virtual types above c get x(α) = 1.
Go back to the cattle example. If the wool and the meat were separate goods, consumption of wool (which has zero marginal cost of production) will be a discontinuous function of type, while consumption of meat would depend on type continuously. However, if a sheep are traded, rather then meat and wool, then the discontinuity may show up in the number of the sheep consumed.
Since in the case m > n, utils n + 1, . . . , m are always produced at constant (zero) marginal cost, I conjecture that a jump on the boundary of the participation region (illustrated in Example 3) is generic. General theorems from the theory of elliptic partial differential equations will guarantee that the bundle continuously depends on type in the interior of the participation region. 2 Conventional wisdom in the screening literature asserts that there are no distortions at the top. In the one-dimensional context the result states that provision of goods for the highest type is efficient, i.e. it maximizes the joint surplus of the consumer and the monopolist. In the case m = n, considered by Rochet and Chone, the result states that the gradient of the total surplus on the intersection of the boundary of Ω with the participation region is tangent to the boundary of Ω. Note that in this case the "no distortions at the top" does not mean that the first best is achieved on the boundary since the gradient of the surplus function is not zero. It rather means that there are no distortions in the outward direction. In the case m = n the tangency condition cannot be formulated in a straightforward way since gradient of the total surplus and the exterior normal to the boundary of the type space have different dimensions. Hence, even formulating the "no distortions at the top" condition will be a delicate matter. To this end observe that introducing utils by z i = v i (x) always reduces the problem with m = n to the problem with m = n. Let S(·, α) denote total surplus, namely, the sum of the monopolist's profit and the utility of the consumer of type α. It is legitimate to ask whether ∇S(z, α) is orthogonal to ν on the intersection of the boundary of Ω with the participation region. If this is the case, say that there are "no distortions at the top" in the production of utils. This is a direct generalization of the similar condition in Rochet and Chone (1998) .
After the discussion in the last paragraph, we are ready to ask whether the "no distortions at the top" condition, in the generalized sense discussed above, holds for m = n. The results of Section 3 show that it does when m < n. Indeed, the problem of production of utils is identical to one studied by Rochet and Chone (1998) and, hence, the result follows. The claim can be strengthened by noting that not only distortions in the outward direction in amount of utils produced are absent, but the utils are provided in a cost minimizing way. The result does not hold, however, for m > n. Indeed, in the framework of Example 3, the result, if true, would suggest that z 1 = 1 for α 1 = 1. However, as we have seen in the previous section, z 1 = a * > 1. Intuitively, this happens because not all levels of util production are feasible. The monopolist cannot decrease production of z 1 while leaving production of z 3 unchanged. Despite this, the amount of the physical goods consumed in the equilibrium by type (1, 1, 1) (the highest type in all directions) is efficient.
To conclude, when the number of screening instruments exceeds the number of the consumer's characteristics the problem is qualitatively the same as in the case when the number of screening instruments is just right. However, the case when the number of screening instruments is insufficient brings new qualitative insights that are worth investigating. Some of them were demonstrated in this paper. a function s (α) = s * (α) + δα n+k − ε for each α such that s * (α) > s 0 (α). Note that s ∈ K for sufficiently small δ > 0 and ε > 0. Since the cost function depends only on ∇s n , the integrand in the definition of π increases by ε. If 0 / ∈ Γ , one can find such values of δ and ε such that new participation region is a superset of the initial one. Otherwise, some points may drop out of the participation region, but their Lebesque measure will be O(ε m ). In any case, π(s ) > π(s * ) for sufficiently small δ and ε. This implies that s * n+j = v n+j (∇s * n ), which completes the proof of the existence.
Proof of the uniqueness is exactly the same as in Rochet and Chone (1998) .
